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SAVING HOMES? BANKRUPTCIES AND LOAN 
MODIFICATIONS IN THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
Alan M. White 
Carolina Reid∗ 
Abstract 
Do homeowner bankruptcy filings work to delay or prevent home 
foreclosures, and how do they compare to voluntary loan modifications 
specifically targeted to mortgage relief? The 2007–2012 financial crisis 
provides a unique opportunity to assess whether bankruptcy can help 
homeowners avoid the negative consequences of over-indebtedness and 
mortgage default. This empirical study analyzes a large, loan-level 
mortgage dataset to determine which variables are associated with 
delinquency and bankruptcy filing, and in turn, whether filing 
bankruptcy or receiving a loan modification measurably influences 
subsequent loan outcomes (e.g., foreclosure sale, prepayment, or default 
cure). Overall, we find that bankruptcy filings delay foreclosures but are 
not generally effective in curing payment defaults, especially when 
compared to modifications negotiated outside of bankruptcy, which are 
highly effective. We also find, consistent with prior research, that 
variations in state bankruptcy and foreclosure law greatly influence 
debtor outcomes from one state to another. Bankruptcy filing is more 
effective in states with nonjudicial foreclosure and limited homeowner 
protections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2007–2012 provides a unique opportunity to 
study consumer indebtedness and to examine how bankruptcy law 
works for delinquent homeowners. According to estimates by the 
Center for Responsible Lending, nearly three million borrowers who 
took out a mortgage between 2004 and 2008 lost their homes to 
foreclosure by February 2011, and nearly four million more households 
were seriously delinquent on their payments and at risk of ending up in 
mortgage default.1 In addition, at the end of 2011, an estimated eleven 
million homeowners were “underwater” on their mortgage, meaning 
that they owed more on their mortgage than the current market value of 
their home. Nearly 40% of underwater borrowers also had second 
mortgage liens.2 Consumer debt also rose to historic highs leading up to 
the subprime crisis; “from 1980 to 2004, revolving debt per household 
increased nearly five-fold in real terms, rising from 3.2% to 12.5% of 
U.S. median family income.”3 
In this Article, we explore whether filing bankruptcy can help these 
consumers address their indebtedness problems and save their homes 
from foreclosure. U.S. bankruptcy law offers some specific tools that 
are particularly relevant to the foreclosure crisis. These include: (1) 
rescheduling mortgage payments; (2) discharging wholly unsecured 
junior mortgage loans in Chapter 13, which should be helpful to 
homeowners given the large number of second liens that were taken out 
during the boom; and (3) the more general benefit of discharging credit 
card and other debt to allow income to be dedicated to mortgage 
payments. In 2009, members of Congress unsuccessfully attempted to 
amend the Bankruptcy Code to give judges the authority to write down 
mortgages on a primary residence to the current fair-market value of the 
property.4 Even though this policy initiative failed, there is reason to 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Deborah Bocian et al., Lost Ground, 2011: Disparities in Mortgage Lending and 
Foreclosures, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 4 (Nov. 2011), http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
mortgage-lending/research-analysis/Lost-Ground-2011.pdf.  
 2. Vicki Been et al., Essay: Sticky Seconds—The Problems Second Liens Pose to 
the Resolution of Distressed Mortgages, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL EST. & URB. POL’Y 2 
(Aug. 2012),http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Essay_Sticky_Seconds_--_The_ 
Problems_Second_Liens_Pose_to_the_Resolution_of_Distressed_Mortgages.pdf. 
 3. Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J.  ECON. PERSP., Fall 
2007, at 175, 175–76 (2007). 
 4. H.R. 200, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009); see also Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the 
Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 571–72 
(2009) (arguing the bankruptcy code should be amended); Mark S. Scarberry, Mortgage Wars 
Episode V—The Empiricist Strikes Back (or Out): A Reply to Professor Levitin’s Response, 37 
PEPP. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (2010) (supporting his critique of the proposed legislation allowing 
strip down and other modification of home mortgages in bankruptcy law).  
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believe that bankruptcy could help some borrowers obtain relief. 
A second option for consumers facing foreclosure is loan 
modification. Loan modifications have been the primary policy 
response to the foreclosure crisis. In 2009, the U.S. government 
announced the Making Home Affordable program, which included a 
modification program (HAMP) and a refinance program (HARP).5 
HAMP allocated $75 billion to loan modification efforts, with a goal of 
reaching three to four million distressed borrowers.6 Although in theory 
both borrower and investor are better off avoiding foreclosure, in 
practice it has proven to be much more difficult to modify loans, and the 
number of modifications has fallen significantly short of the number of 
distressed borrowers. For example, in its first year, HAMP resulted in 
230,801 permanent modifications at a time when millions of mortgage 
borrowers faced foreclosure.7 Research on loan modifications has 
identified several barriers to the loan modification process, including 
securitization,8 and limited incentives for servicers to modify loans or 
invest in building the capacity to respond to the volume of distressed 
borrowers.9  
                                                                                                                     
 5. Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the 
Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 
727, 748 &  n.97 (2010). 
 6. Id. at 729, 763; see also NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED 
MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 127 (2012). 
 7. Braucher, supra note 5, at 729. 
 8. Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is Good 
for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 279, 279, 287–92 (2007); Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting 
Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1087–112 (2009); Tomasz Piskorski et al., Securitization and Distressed 
Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 1–2 (Chi. Booth Sch. of 
Bus., Research Paper No. 09-02, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=1321646. Some researchers, however, have suggested that securitization is a red 
herring when it comes to modifications, showing for example that loans held in portfolio are no 
more or less likely to be modified than loans that are held in mortgage backed securities. See 
Manuel Adelino et al., Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, 
Self-Cures, and Securitization 4–6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Pub. Policy Discussion Paper 
No. 09-4, 2009), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0904.pdf. 
Instead, they contend that lenders are reluctant to modify loans for two key reasons. First, 
approximately 30% of borrowers “self-cure,” meaning that they bring their loans current on 
their own. In this instance, lenders would lose revenue unnecessarily by offering a modification. 
Id. at 7. Second, lenders may also be concerned that if a borrower redefaults after a 
modification, the modification will have simply postponed foreclosure. In such a case, if the 
housing market continues to decline, the lender would recover even less in foreclosure in the 
future. Id. 
 9. Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers and Designing Loan 
Modifications to Address the Mortgage Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:  
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 231, 231–32 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2010). 
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Interestingly, only a few studies have examined the relationship 
between the foreclosure crisis and bankruptcy filings,10 and even fewer 
have considered the effectiveness of both bankruptcies and 
modifications. This Article seeks to help fill that gap. Evidence on the 
relationship between bankruptcy and the foreclosure crisis is mixed. 
While bankruptcies have increased in states with the highest rates of 
foreclosure, such as Arizona and Nevada, other states such as Tennessee 
and Alabama continue to see extremely high levels of bankruptcies,11 
despite the fact that their housing and mortgage markets have been more 
insulated from the boom and bust cycle seen in the sand states.12 Indeed, 
consumer bankruptcy filings rose steadily but slowly during the 
subprime crisis period without any noticeable decline during the months 
that modifications peaked.13 In addition, between 2006 and 2009, 
consumer filings for Chapter 13—the type of bankruptcy designed to 
offer debtors tools to restructure mortgages and other secured debt—
actually declined, from roughly 40% to about 25% of bankruptcies.14 
Superficially, it would appear that bankruptcy filings, and especially 
Chapter 13 filings, did not rise and fall in response to mortgage debt 
distress or foreclosure activity. 
In order to better understand the role that the U.S. bankruptcy system 
has played in the subprime crisis, this study looks at a large database of 
subprime and “Alt-A” mortgage loans and their performance from 2007 
to 2011. We begin by setting the context for the empirical study by 
exploring trends in bankruptcy filings in the data. We then present three 
sets of models. First, we explore which factors influence the likelihood 
that a mortgage loan ever becomes sixty-days delinquent. Second, we 
assess the factors that influence the likelihood that a borrower will file 
bankruptcy or receive a loan modification, conditional on the loan being 
at least sixty-days delinquent. Third, we model the effect of bankruptcy 
filing and loan modification on subsequent loan performance. How did 
distressed homeowners who filed bankruptcy fare compared to those 
who did not file for relief or to those who instead pursued a loan 
modification? In the final Part we explore state variations in bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Wenli Li & Michelle J. White, Does Bankruptcy Reduce Foreclosure? 3 (Dec. 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with American Economic Association), available at 
http://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2012conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=410. 
 11. See infra Figure 4. 
 12. See Steve Matthews, States Hardest Hit by Housing Collapse Lead U.S. Jobs 
Recovery, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
09/states-hardest-hit-by-real-estate-collapse-lead-u-s-labor-market-recovery.html. 
 13. See infra Figure 1. 
 14. Bob Lawless, Chapter 13 Rate Down Sharply in March, CREDIT SLIPS: A DISCUSSION 
ON CREDIT, FIN., & BANKR. (Apr. 21, 2009, 4:49 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2009/04/chap 
ter-13-rate-down-sharply-in-march.html. 
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filings and borrower outcomes. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
Consumer homeowners typically seek relief under either Chapter 7 
or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.15 Chapter 7 requires the debtor 
to surrender all nonexempt property for distribution to creditors. In 
return, the debtor’s debts are discharged, with some exceptions.16 
Chapter 13 permits debtors with regular income to keep their property 
and to repay creditors in whole or in part by making monthly payments 
to a Chapter 13 trustee, who then distributes the payments to creditors.17 
In either type of bankruptcy, the filing acts as an automatic stay of any 
foreclosure action.18 
Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy allow a distressed 
homeowner to reduce or eliminate unsecured debts, such as credit card 
and medical bills.19 Discharging this unsecured debt can be a valuable 
tool for homeowners struggling to meet mortgage payments by freeing 
up some of their income.20 Chapter 13 also permits a homeowner to 
gradually cure a default in mortgage payments by making future 
payments and liquidating arrears over the life of the payment plan.21 
Chapter 13 plans require repayment in three to five years.22 The 
foreclosure stay continues until the payment plan is completed, unless 
the case is dismissed or the stay is lifted, which often happens when the 
homeowner does not make plan payments.23 
While Chapter 13 permits debtors to modify the terms of most of 
their debts, a special provision prohibits modification of a first lien 
residential mortgage without the lender’s consent.24 Thus a Chapter 13 
payment plan must include repaying the first mortgage debt without 
changes to the principal, interest rate, or term.25 Chapter 13 does, 
however, permit voiding second mortgages (“strip-down”) when the 
first mortgage exceeds the property value, leaving the second mortgage 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Levitin, supra note 4, at 579. 
 16.  Id. 
 17. Id. at 579, 643. 
 18. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
 19. John Eggum et al., Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan 
Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1126; see also David L. Balser, Section 707(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code: A Roadmap with a Proposed Standard for Defining Substantial Abuse, 19 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1011, 1013–15 (1986).  
 20. Eggum, supra note 19, at 1126. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 1143. 
 23. Id. at 1144 & n.81. 
 24. See Levitin, supra note 4, at 573–75 n.26, 581–82; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), 
(5) (2012). 
 25. Levitin, supra note 4, at 582. 
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effectively unsecured.26 For mortgage borrowers with a second lien, 
then, Chapter 13 could provide significant relief, and help to bring the 
debt owed on the home more in line with current home values. 
Moreover, filing under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 stays any 
foreclosure, which may permit additional time to negotiate a voluntary 
modification with the lender. This may be especially important in states 
with quick, nonjudicial foreclosure processes. Thus, bankruptcy can 
provide homeowners additional time to negotiate with their lender, 
eliminate competing payment obligations for other debts (including 
underwater junior mortgages), and allow a homeowner to cure a 
payment default, albeit without otherwise modifying mortgage terms. It 
is therefore plausible to expect that homeowners affected by the 
foreclosure crisis would in some cases file bankruptcy in order to delay 
or prevent foreclosure.  
In contrast to bankruptcy filings, loan modifications are specifically 
designed to address borrowers’ ability to repay their mortgages. “Loan 
modification” is a general term that applies when the original contract 
governing a loan is changed. It typically involves reducing the interest 
rate and monthly payment, extending the loan term, or reducing the 
principal owed on the loan.27 However, “loans can be modified in 
multiple ways, and not always in a way that is favorable to the 
borrower.”28 For example, most pre-HAMP voluntary modifications 
increased a borrower’s monthly payment as well as the principal owed 
on the loan.29 Not surprisingly, studies analyzing the impacts of these 
loan modifications found high rates of subsequent default.30 In addition, 
early policy efforts—such as HOPE NOW’s efforts to set industry 
guidelines and the government’s Hope for Homeowners program—did 
little to streamline the modification process, nor did they provide 
incentives to servicers to step up their efforts.31  
In 2009, the U.S. government announced the Making Home 
Affordable Program (HAMP), which allocated $75 billion to loan 
modification efforts.32 Under the program, eligible borrowers work with 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 582 n.46. 
 27. See J.M. Collins & C.K. Reid, Who Receives a Mortgage Modification? Race and 
Income Differentials in Loan Workouts 3 (Jan. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743159. 
 28. Id.  
 29. See Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 
Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1112 & n.19 (2009).  
 30. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT 
SUPERVISION, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT 4 (2008), 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/mort 
gage-metrics-q3-2008/mortgage-metrics-q3-2008-pdf.pdf. 
 31. See Braucher, supra note 5, at 756. 
 32. Id. at 728–29 & n.2. 
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the servicer to reduce their monthly payments to 38% of their income, 
and then HAMP provides a subsidy to further reduce the payments to 
31%.33 To overcome incentive barriers, servicers also receive an up-
front fee of $1,000 for each modification, plus “pay for success” fees on 
performing modified loans of $1,000 per year for up to three years.34 
Borrowers are eligible for a HAMP modification on first-lien loans for 
owner-occupied properties with an unpaid principal balance of less than 
$729,750 originated on or before January 1, 2009.35 All borrowers must 
document their income by providing a signed IRS 4506-T form to share 
tax data with the servicer,36 their two most recent pay stubs, a copy of a 
their most recent tax return, and a signed affidavit of financial 
hardship.37 
Despite the policy emphasis on loan modifications as a solution to 
the foreclosure crisis, very few loans are ever modified. Even with 
HAMP, the scale of modifications is still small compared to the number 
of seriously delinquent loans, with estimates ranging between 3% and 
8% depending on how “modification” is defined.38 This suggests that 
not all borrowers in distress will be able to obtain a loan modification, 
and may seek bankruptcy as another form of relief. In particular, 
borrowers with second mortgages may face a particularly hard time 
getting a modification; junior liens can complicate the loan 
renegotiation process since multiple investors with different interests 
may thwart servicers’ efforts to provide the borrower with an effective 
modification.39  
Despite the fact that distressed borrowers have these two different 
strategies available to save their homes, the legal and economic 
literature on mortgage borrower bankruptcy and loan modifications are 
largely separate. For example, Yan Zhang’s recent study on foreclosures 
and mortgage modifications deliberately excluded mortgages in 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. at 752. 
 34. Id. HAMP also provides bonus incentives of $1,500 and $1,000 to lender–investors 
and servicers, respectively, and an additional $500 to servicers for modifications made while a 
borrower is still current on mortgage payments but at imminent risk of default. Id. 
 35. Braucher, supra note 5, at 748–49. 
 36. Request a Home Affordable Modification, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE.GOV, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/get-started/request-modification/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2013). 
 37. See Proof of Income Checklist, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE.GOV, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/get-started/request-modification/Pages/checklist.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2013); Request for Modification and Affidavit (RMA), MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE.GOV 
(form), http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/get-assistance/request-modification/Documents/ 
RMA%20Interactive%20-%20Updated%2011.10.09.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2013). 
 38. Adelino et al., supra note 8, at 3. 
 39. See Been et al., supra note 2, at 16–17. 
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bankruptcy because of their peculiar performance characteristics.40 In 
addition, only a few studies have focused on the interactions between 
bankruptcy and mortgage default outcomes, and many of these predate 
the most recent foreclosure crisis.  
First, a few studies have examined the characteristics that lead to 
bankruptcy filing. One important finding in the literature is that not all 
homeowners who file bankruptcy are delinquent or facing foreclosure,41 
which suggests that many other reasons can lead to a bankruptcy filing. 
However, recent research suggests that homeowners who file Chapter 
13 are usually seeking to save their home from foreclosure.42 In 
addition, homeowners who file for bankruptcy generally have high 
payment-to-income ratios and little or no equity in their homes.43 These 
studies suggest that one should find a relationship between mortgage 
delinquency and bankruptcy filings, especially as the housing market 
downturn eroded equity that borrowers could tap to resolve unpaid 
debts. 
Second, and directly related to this study, a small number of studies 
have examined whether bankruptcy filing can prevent or cure mortgage 
default. Although focused on the time period before the foreclosure 
crisis, Professor Sarah W. Carroll and Wenli Li examined whether 
Chapter 13 plans to cure mortgage arrears were successful.44 They 
focused on a sample of homeowners in Delaware who filed bankruptcy 
in 2001 and 2002, and observed the subsequent loan performance 
through October 2007.45 Carroll and Li found that bankruptcy filers lost 
their homes in 28% of cases, compared with 43% of homeowners who 
entered foreclosure and did not file bankruptcy.46  
In examining the impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Jiequn Guo found that 
from 2003 to 2006, the percentage of bankruptcy filers who were 
delinquent on their mortgage increased and that the percentage of 
borrowers in bankruptcy who were able to “cure” their loan decreased 
                                                                                                                     
 40. See Yan Zhang, Does Loan Renegotiation Differ by Securitization Status? An 
Empirical Study 8–9 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773103.  
 41. E.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Mortgage Problems Through the Lens of Bankruptcy, 
10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 171, 176 (2009). 
 42. Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14179, 2008). 
 43. See Raisa Bahchieva et al., Mortgage Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Sustainability of 
Homeownership, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73, 78–80, 94–96 (Patrick Bolton & 
Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005); see also Eggum, supra note 19, at 1158. 
 44. Sarah W. Carroll & Wenli Li, The Homeownership Experience of Households in 
Bankruptcy, 13 CITYSCAPE, no. 1, 2011, at 113, 114–16. 
 45. Id. at 114. 
 46. Id. at 123. 
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significantly.47 Guo concluded that BAPCPA restricted bankruptcy 
filings to mortgage borrowers who were in greater distress and were 
therefore more likely to fail than the class of borrowers who filed 
bankruptcy prior to the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.48  
Only a couple of studies have examined outcomes for consumers 
during the post-2007 foreclosure crisis. Among a sample of 
homeowners who filed Chapter 13 and did not complete their plans, 
Professor Katherine Porter found low rates of success in preventing 
default.49 According to Porter, 70% of homeowners filing Chapter 13 in 
2008 and 2009 sought to save their home, but the vast majority of cases 
were dismissed and the lender likely foreclosed.50 Finally, an early 
working paper by Wenli Li and Michelle J. White found that relatively 
few borrowers facing foreclosure sought relief through bankruptcy.  For 
those who did, bankruptcy filings delayed both the filing of foreclosure 
and the conclusion of the foreclosure sale.51 
Compared to the literature on bankruptcy and mortgage default, the 
literature on the determinants of mortgage modifications and loan 
outcomes is vast.52 While not reviewed extensively here, these studies 
reveal the factors that influence modification and borrower outcomes, 
although no study of mortgage default outcomes considers bankruptcy 
as a potential form of relief.  
For example, Professor Sewin Chan and co-authors examined 
mortgage loans in New York City originated between 2003 and 2008, 
with performance observed through October 2010.53 They found that, of 
homeowners who received a foreclosure notice, only 14% ultimately 
lost their home in a foreclosure sale,54 and about half remained active at 
the end of the observation period, although most were still delinquent.55 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Jiequn Guo, The Impact of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law on Subprime Mortgage 
Performance, 16 J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2010, at 33, 35–36. 
 48. See id. at 36. 
 49. Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 144–47  (2011). 
 50. Id. at 132, 136, 147.  
 51. Li & White, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
 52. See, e.g., Adelino et al., supra note 8, at 2; Vicki Been et al., Determinants of the 
Incidence of Loan Modifications 3–4 (NYU Law and Econ. Working Papers, Working Paper 
No. 287, 2011), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/287; Sewin Chan et al., Pathways 
After Default: What Happens to Distressed Mortgage Borrowers and Their Homes? 1 (NYU 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-33, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928212; Collins & Reid, supra note 27, at 2; Cordell et al., supra note 
9, at 231; Roberto G. Quercia & Lei Ding, Loan Modifications and Redefault Risk: An 
Examination of Short-Term Impacts, 11 CITYSCAPE, no. 3, 2012, at 171, 172–73 (2009).  
 53. Chan et. al., supra note 52, at 11–13.  
 54. Id. at 13. 
 55. Id. at 14. 
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The Chan study treated modification as a competing outcome but did 
not study bankruptcy filings.56 It found that owner–occupants who had 
been in their homes longer were generally more likely to obtain a 
modification and less likely to lose their homes at foreclosure sales.57 
On the other hand, borrowers with higher credit scores were less likely 
to receive modifications, perhaps because servicers expected them to 
cure defaults without modification.58 Geographically, communities with 
greater home price depreciation and more subprime lending 
concentration saw higher foreclosure sale rates.59 Professor J.M. Collins 
and Carolina Reid studied the impact of mortgage modifications on 
foreclosure outcomes using the same data as this Article. They found 
that completed foreclosure sales were associated with higher loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios, higher interest rates, and higher rates of home price 
decline in the property neighborhood.60 They also found that 
modification significantly reduced the likelihood of an eventual 
foreclosure,61 a result confirmed in our study.  
Other studies have examined the role of state laws or “delays” in the 
foreclosure process on borrower outcomes.62 One study, for example, 
looked at variation in state legislation to determine the impact of delay 
on foreclosures.63 The study found that borrowers in judicial foreclosure 
states, which take significantly longer to conclude the foreclosure 
process, are no more likely to cure or renegotiate their loans.64 On the 
other hand, Collins and coauthors used a “border” model and found that 
judicial foreclosure requirements slightly increased the probability of a 
formal renegotiation of contract terms or a modification.65  
To summarize, prior research demonstrates that homeowners often 
file for bankruptcy to prevent foreclosure. Bankruptcy seems to improve 
a homeowner’s chances of preventing, or at least delaying, foreclosure. 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See id. at 1–2. 
 57. See id. at 5. 
 58. Id. at 10. 
 59. Id. at 26. 
 60. See Collins & Reid, supra note 27, at 11. 
 61. Id. at 12. 
 62. See J. Michael Collins et al., State Mortgage Foreclosure Policies & Lender 
Interventions: Impacts on Borrower Behavior in Default, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 216, 
218 (2011); Kristopher Gerardi et al., Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? 
Evidence from the Foreclosure Process 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 17666, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17666; Shuang Zhu & R. Kelley 
Pace, The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on Future Default, Loan Losses, and Contract Rates 
2 (Dec. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://srsabr2011.files.wordpress.com/ 
2011/01/foreclosure_pace_zhu_1204.pdf. 
 63. Gerardi et al., supra note 62, at 1–2. 
 64. Id. at 16. 
 65. See Collins et al., supra note 62, at 226. 
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Homeowner success rates in bankruptcy are still low, however, and 
many homeowners fail to complete Chapter 13 repayment plans. By 
restricting bankruptcy access to the most distressed debtors, BAPCA 
may have reduced a homeowner’s chance of preventing foreclosure. In 
contrast, negotiated mortgage modifications undertaken since 2008 have 
significantly reduced the likelihood of a defaulted mortgage ending with 
a foreclosure sale, which suggests that modifications may be preferable 
to bankruptcy when the goal is to save a primary residence from 
foreclosure.  
Our study adds to the literature by comparing the effect of 
modification and bankruptcy filing on the prevention of home 
foreclosures in the context of the recent foreclosure crisis. In other 
words, this study assesses differences in foreclosure outcomes for a 
national sample of mortgage holders depending on the type of relief 
they sought to save their homes. In addition, we take advantage of a 
large, national-scale dataset on loan performance to examine state 
variations in loan outcomes.  
II.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our study uses a large dataset of subprime and Alt-A privately 
securitized home mortgages that are managed by Corporate Trust 
Services (CTS) of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., also known as the Columbia 
Collateral File. CTS is a service of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. that 
provides information on a variety of investment vehicles administered 
by the bank. The CTS data covers securitized mortgages for which 
Wells Fargo serves as trustee and includes mortgages with different 
interest rate structures, purposes, property types, and lien statuses. The 
database includes over four million loans originated as early as the 
1980s and tracks performance monthly until the loan is paid off or 
foreclosed upon. The database contains a large number of both static 
and time-varying variables related to each loan, including the 
borrower’s FICO credit score, LTV ratio, loan purpose (e.g., purchase 
versus refinance), loan type and terms (e.g., fixed versus adjustable, 
balloon payment, or repayment schedule), the original and current loan 
balance, and the property zip code.66 
To construct the dataset used in this analysis, we limit our sample to 
first-lien, single-family, owner-occupied loans originated between 2001 
and 2006 that were still active as of December 2006. We also limit the 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, WELLS FARGO [hereinafter CTS Data], 
http://www.ctslink.com (login required) (customized dataset on file with Florida Law Review). 
These investor report files are administered by the Corporate Trust Services group of Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. Id.; see also Quercia & Ding, supra note 52, at 177, 182; White, supra note 
29, at 1112 & n.17. 
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sample to loans originated within metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). 
We then track the performance of these loans through June 2011, 
distinguishing between loans that are “current,” “active delinquent,” 
“foreclosed upon,” and “prepaid.” Unfortunately, the data do not 
distinguish between voluntary prepayments and those resulting from 
borrower distress (e.g., short sales).67 We treat prepayments with a 
reported loss as foreclosure liquidations, while prepayments with no 
reported loss are treated as voluntary prepayments.68 A substantial 
number of cases (about 14.8% of the sample) are missing data on the 
final outcome of the loan, meaning that they were no longer active in 
the final month but were not recorded as having transitioned to 
prepayment, foreclosure, or real-estate owned (REO). As discussed in 
more detail below, we treat these observations as right-censored in the 
models. However, we also conducted robustness checks using imputed 
variable values and found that the missing loan observations did not 
substantially change the model results. 
The loan-level data also include information about whether the 
borrower filed bankruptcy or received a loan modification, but the 
bankruptcy status variable does not distinguish between Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings. In addition, because mortgage servicers 
report the bankruptcy variable as a loan status, it likely does not 
coincide exactly with the filing and termination of the bankruptcy court 
case, but rather reflects the duration of the automatic stay, with some 
possible time lag. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy variable permits fine-
grained analysis of the effect of bankruptcy filings on mortgage 
performance.  
To control for borrower and loan characteristics that may influence 
loan outcomes, the following variables were included in the models: 
borrower FICO scores at origination, the loan-to-value at origination, 
loan purpose, loan interest type (adjustable or fixed interest rate), 
whether underwriting entailed full documentation, loan size 
(distinguishing between loans under $75,000 and those over 
$729,000),69 and whether the loan included a prepayment penalty or a 
balloon payment. We also include a separate variable that accounts for 
whether the loan was structured with an initial teaser interest rate. 
Because of the large number of potential interest rate structures, this 
variable is limited to the following interest types for adjustable-rate 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See infra Tables 1–3. 
 68. As a result, deeds-in-lieu may be reported as voluntary prepayments, and voluntary 
short sales are assimilated with foreclosure liquidations. 
 69. See infra Table 1. We also tried the model with a linear specification of loan size, but 
the existing literature suggests that the loan size is nonlinearly related to both default and 
prepayment rates. See Robert M. Dunsky & Thomas S.Y. Ho, Valuing Fixed Rate Mortgage 
Loans with Default and Prepayment Options, 16 J. FIXED INCOME, no. 4, 2007, at 7, 18–21. 
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mortgages (ARMs): 2/28 ARM, 3/27 ARM, 5/25 ARM, 3-Year ARM, 
5-Year ARM, 2/6 Month ARM, and 3/6 Month ARM.  As a proxy to 
indicate the presence of a second lien, we include a dummy variable for 
whether the initial LTV was exactly 80%. Loans with 80% LTV may 
actually understate borrower leverage due to the prevalence of 
borrowers taking out a “piggyback” 20% loan.  
In addition to the variables contained within the CTS database, we 
append additional information to each loan record to capture relevant 
housing and economic market characteristics. To account for the 
relationship between house price changes and loan performance 
outcomes, we construct two variables using the nonseasonally adjusted, 
quarterly Federal Housing Finance Agency house price index at the 
MSA level. The first is the MSA house price change between the first 
quarter of 2000 and the quarter of origination; the second is the MSA 
house price change between the quarter of origination and the first 
quarter of 2011.70 This allows us to capture the extent to which 
borrowers were caught up in the “boom and bust” cycle of the recent 
subprime crisis. In addition, we append data on the county 
unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, including the 
unemployment rate at origination and in December 2009. To account 
for neighborhood-level factors, we include data at the census tract level 
from the 2005–2009 American Community Survey on the percentage of 
minority residents, the percentage of residents over the age of twenty-
five who completed college, and the median house values. Previous 
studies found neighborhood-level variations in the incidence of 
bankruptcy filings and loan modifications.71 In addition, absent 
information on borrower socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, these variables may serve as a proxy for individual 
characteristics.  
Table 1 presents the basic descriptive statistics for the entire sample 
as well as for the loans that went sixty or more days delinquent at any 
time between December 2006 and July 2011. The sample includes 
approximately 1.5 million loans, 38.4% of which entered delinquency, 
reflecting the overall poor performance of privately securitized 
subprime and Alt-A loans over this time period. Although we include 
earlier origination years, the majority of loans (65.6%) in the sample 
were originated in 2005 and 2006. The sample is heavily skewed 
                                                                                                                     
 70. News Release, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Housing Price Index Falls 2.5 
Percent in First Quarter 2011 (May 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21305/UPDATE D_HPI_REPORT--2011Q1_June2011.pdf. 
 71. See, e.g., Been et al., supra note 2, at 22 (exploring in part “how the housing market 
conditions in a neighborhood affect the likelihood that a loan on a property within the 
neighborhood will be modified”). 
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towards ARMs (nearly 70%), and 37.9% of all loans were teaser ARMs, 
meaning that the loan originated at a low interest rate with low monthly 
payments but reset after a specified time period to a higher rate and 
payment. Compared to the full sample, delinquent loans are more likely 
to be those with adjustable interest rates, teaser ARMS, prepayment 
penalties, lower FICO scores, and higher LTVs. In addition, delinquent 
loans were more common in MSAs where house prices dropped 
significantly after origination (a decline of 28.0%, compared to 19.7% 
for the full sample). 
Importantly, as shown in Table 2, a significant percentage of loans in 
the sample either filed bankruptcy or received a loan modification. For 
the full sample, 7.7% of borrowers filed bankruptcy and 8.4% received 
a loan modification. Another 1.3% both filed bankruptcy and received a 
loan modification. The percentages are higher for delinquent borrowers, 
with 17.9% filing bankruptcy, 19.9% receiving a loan modification, and 
3.3% registering both. 
Table 3 presents the final outcome of the loans in the sample as of 
June 2011. Reflecting the poor performance of privately securitized 
subprime and Alt-A loans, the delinquency rates of the sample are 
extremely high. Of all the loans in the sample, only 22.3% were current, 
16.8% had gone through the foreclosure process and were either REO 
or sold at auction, 38.8% were prepaid, and 7.3% were active and 
delinquent. Among delinquent loans, 43.4% were foreclosed upon, 19% 
were still active and delinquent, and only 16.8% had reverted back to 
current status. Interestingly, among delinquent loans that were in 
bankruptcy, a similar percentage nevertheless ended in foreclosure 
(42.8%), but a much larger share remained active and delinquent: 28.7% 
compared to 19.0% for all delinquent loans. In contrast, among 
delinquent loans that received a modification, far fewer ended in 
foreclosure, and a much greater share (51.7%) were current at the end of 
the observation period. 
Figure 1 shows the monthly distribution of the percentage of loans in 
the sample that went into foreclosure, bankruptcy, or received a 
modification. The line graph shows the increase in foreclosures, which 
increased dramatically from 2007 through 2008 and remained at 
elevated levels over the entire study period (linked to the right axis). 
Interestingly, the incidence of modifications shows the greatest 
volatility over time, largely due to changes in the policy environment. 
Starting in mid-2007, the percentage of modifications slowly increased 
as servicers instituted voluntary mortgage modification programs.72 In 
March 2009, the Obama Administration announced the HAMP 
program; implementation was slow, and it took approximately a year 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See Braucher, supra note 5, at 769. 
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before the HAMP program caused a second spike in permanent 
modifications.73 In contrast, the percentage of new monthly bankruptcy 
filings remained relatively constant from January 2007 through June 
2011.74 These data suggest that bankruptcy starts were not necessarily 
driven by the rise in foreclosures over the same time period. Despite the 
fact that the world of mortgage defaults, prepayments, and 
modifications was vastly different in June 2011 than it had been in 
January 2007, new bankruptcy filings reveal a remarkably consistent 
pattern over time. 
Consistent with other studies, this study finds that most bankruptcies 
terminate well before the three to five years required to complete a 
Chapter 13 plan. Although the CTS data do not distinguish between 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, most of the bankruptcies are likely Chapter 
13 filings.75 Figure 2 shows the cumulative bankruptcy duration in 
months for cases filed in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. Bankruptcies 
reached a 50% cumulative termination rate after just four to five 
months, and 70% cumulative termination after five to twelve months. 
Consistent with Guo, this study finds that the duration of bankruptcies 
(or bankruptcy stays) trended down over time,76 except for 2010 filings. 
Thus, the likelihood of success, as measured by remaining in 
bankruptcy for more than a few months to implement a plan or to obtain 
a discharge, declined from 2007 to 2009.  
In order to better understand the role that the U.S. bankruptcy system 
has played in the subprime crisis, our study examines the extent to 
which filing bankruptcy influences mortgage loan outcomes. The study 
seeks to address three key questions. First, we establish a context by 
exploring which factors influence the likelihood that a loan in the 
sample ever becomes sixty-days delinquent. Second, we assess the 
factors that influence the likelihood that a borrower will either file 
bankruptcy or receive a loan modification,77 conditional on being at 
least sixty-days delinquent. Third, we model the effect of bankruptcy 
filing on subsequent loan performance. How do distressed homeowners 
who filed bankruptcy fare compared to those who did not file for relief 
or to those who instead pursued a loan modification?  
III.  ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND FINDINGS 
To answer these questions, we follow a rich literature on mortgage 
terminations and estimate a proportional hazards model using a 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id. at 730–32. 
 74. See infra Figure 1. 
 75. See CTS Data, supra note 66.  
 76. Guo, supra note 47, at 36 & exhibit 5. 
 77. In this analysis, loans that are associated with both a bankruptcy filing and a loan 
modification are included in both sets of models.  
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competing risks framework.78 Although this study is not focused 
specifically on identifying the factors that lead a borrower to choose the 
put or call option, the competing risks framework remains important 
due to its ability to account for “terminal” events that remove the loan 
from the risk of experiencing a separate event. For example, we cannot 
observe a modification or bankruptcy filing if the loan has already been 
prepaid or foreclosed upon. Figure 3 below provides the competing 
events that we assess for each model stage. 
 
Figure 3: Competing Risks for Models 
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 78. See, e.g., Brent W. Ambrose & Michael LaCour-Little, Prepayment Risk in Adjustable 
Rate Mortgages Subject to Initial Year Discounts: Some New Evidence, 29 REAL EST. ECON. 
305, 315 (2001); Brian A. Ciochetti et al., The Termination of Commercial Mortgage Contracts 
Through Prepayment and Default: A Proportional Hazard Approach with Competing Risks, 30 
REAL EST. ECON. 595, 595–99 (2002); Yongheng Deng et al., Mortgage Terminations, 
Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options, 68 ECONOMETRICA 275, 276–77 (2000); 
Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giamg Ho, The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed-Rate 
Mortgages, 38 REAL EST. ECON. 399, 400 (2010). There is also a rich discussion in the mortgage 
literature about the advantages and disadvantages of using a multinomial logit versus a 
proportional hazards approach to modeling competing risks. See Mark Y. An & Zhikun Qi, 
Competing Risks Models Using Mortgage Duration Data Under the Proportional Hazards 
Assumption, 34 J. REAL EST. RES. 1 (2012), available at http://aux.zicklin.baruch.uny.edu/jrer/ 
papers/abstract/past/av34n01/vol34n01_01.htm (presenting an empirical review of alternate 
approaches); John M. Clapp et al., Alternative Models for Competing Risks of Mortgage 
Termination 3 (Sept. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Lusk Center for 
Research, University of Southern California), available at http://www.yumpu.com/en/document/ 
view/17583427/alternative-models-for-competing-risks-of-mortgae-termination. This Article 
uses the proportional hazards approach because of the ease of interpreting the effects of the 
coefficients on the hazards for each outcome. Robustness checks using the multinomial 
approach revealed that the substantive conclusions do not differ dramatically between the two 
methods.  
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For each model, the hazard for outcome j, hj(t) is the probability that 
the loan experiences event type j at time T, conditional on surviving to 
time t, 
 
 
 
The conditional hazard function is factored into a “baseline” hazard 
b
jh that is a function of t alone, and a function ),( jx βφ that incorporates 
the explanatory variables related to the hazard of interest; covariates are 
allowed to impact the competing event hazards in different ways.79 This 
specification lends itself to a straightforward interpretation of the effects 
of the covariates on the hazard rate for each event. A hazard ratio 
greater than one indicates the estimated increase in the event probability 
associated with that particular covariate, whereas a hazard ratio less 
than one indicates the estimated decrease in event probability. 
For all the models, we cluster the standard errors by zip code. We 
also include time (year of origination) and state fixed effects for each 
specification.80 
A.  Loan Delinquencies, Bankruptcies,  
Modifications, and Loan Outcomes 
Table 4 presents the results from the first model, predicting the 
likelihood of a loan ever going sixty-days delinquent. Overall, the 
model is consistent with expectations and previous research modeling 
the determinants of delinquencies. Loans with riskier product features—
such as teaser rates, balloon payments, and prepayment penalties, and 
limited or no documentation—all increase the likelihood of 
delinquency.81 Borrowers with higher FICO scores and lower LTVs are 
                                                                                                                     
 79. This study assumes that the functionφ takes an exponential form so that the hazard is 
given by ).exp()()|( j
b
jj xthxth β=  
 80. We also tested the efficacy of using year and quarter fixed effects and MSA fixed 
effects, as well as their interaction, in the models. However, the goodness-of-fit tests showed 
that these models were less efficient than just including cohort and state fixed effects, and 
greatly increased processing time. The proportional hazards framework allows the research to 
set up the data in either a stacked panel format (with one observation for every loan for every 
month in the data) or as one observation per loan. PAUL D. ALLISON, SURVIVAL ANALYSIS USING 
SAS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2010). This study chooses the latter to be able to use the larger 
sample, and because this study does not have a large number of time-varying variables in the 
model. 
 81. Brent W. Ambrose et al., A Note on Hybrid Mortgages, 33 REAL EST. ECON. 765, 780 
(2005); Lei Ding et al., Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects Using 
Propensity Score Models, 33 J. REAL EST. RES. 245, 248 (2011); Pennington-Cross & Ho, supra 
note 78, at 402, 423; Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on 
Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment Penalties and Balloon Payments 7–8, 
11 (Jan. 25, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Center for Community Capitalism, 
δ
δ
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less likely to experience delinquency. The value of the 80% LTV 
dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that the dummy is 
successfully picking up borrowers who financed their homes with both 
a first and second lien. Loans under $75,000 are more likely to be 
delinquent than loans above $75,000; however, we do not find an effect 
for loans over $729,000, which may be due to the small percentage of 
jumbo loans in the sample. 
The effects of socioeconomic and housing market factors are also 
mostly significant, though the effects are modest for neighborhood-level 
factors. As expected, areas that saw large house price depreciation 
increased the likelihood of delinquency, while areas that did not decline 
as far reduced the likelihood of delinquency. The interpretation of the 
unemployment control is less clear. While the county unemployment 
rate is positively correlated with the incidence of delinquency on its 
own, in the full model, it flips sign and shows that the delinquency 
hazard decreases with higher unemployment. This likely reflects the 
interaction between local unemployment conditions and other variables 
in the model—including the origination cohort and state controls—that 
should be capturing changes in the strength of the local economy over 
the period.  
Although the magnitudes of the hazards are quite small, loans in 
neighborhoods with a greater concentration of minority residents are 
more likely to become delinquent, whereas the opposite effect is found 
in neighborhoods with a large share of college graduates. Finally, the 
model also shows that there is a strong correlation between borrower 
financial distress, bankruptcy filing, and mortgage delinquency. 
Borrowers who filed bankruptcy were 2.6 times more likely to 
subsequently become delinquent than were borrowers who did not file 
bankruptcy. State fixed effects have little impact on the overall model; 
the largest shift is reducing the relative impact of various LTV buckets 
on the likelihood of delinquency. 
In the second model presented in Table 5, we explore the factors that 
lead borrowers who are at least sixty-days delinquent on their mortgage 
to file for bankruptcy. We find that borrowers with refinance loans with 
ARMs were more likely to file bankruptcy compared to purchase loans 
and those with fixed interest rates. Borrowers whose loans have 
prepayment penalties are slightly less likely to file for bankruptcy. 
Borrowers who only provided limited or no documentation are slightly 
more likely to file for bankruptcy, but the effect is small. Loans with 
“affordability” features, such as teaser ARMs or balloon payments seem 
to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy filing, as do cash-out refinance 
                                                                                                                     
University of North Carolina), available at http://ccc.unc.edu/contentitems/impacts-of-prepay 
ment-penalties-and-balloon-loans-on-foreclosure-starts-in-selected-states-supplemental-tables. 
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loans.  
There is a strong relationship between home values and bankruptcy 
filings. Not surprisingly, borrowers with high LTVs were significantly 
more likely to file bankruptcy. For borrowers who enter financial 
distress, the lack of home equity to cover other debts and expenses 
appears to have driven bankruptcy filings over this time period. The 
80% LTV dummy variable (suggesting the potential for a second lien) is 
also significantly and positively associated with bankruptcy filing. This 
supports the hypothesis that some borrowers may be choosing Chapter 
13 to extinguish their second mortgage.82 We find strong cohort 
effects—borrowers with loans originated between 2002 and 2004 are 
significantly less likely to file bankruptcy than those with loans 
originated in 2006, probably influenced in part by the ability to tap into 
home equity over this time period due to rising home values. 
Interestingly, borrowers with the lowest and highest FICO scores are 
the least likely to file for bankruptcy. The main effect is evident among 
borrowers with FICO scores between 620 and 720, who are more likely 
to file for bankruptcy than borrowers with FICO scores below 580. In 
addition, borrowers with jumbo loans—those over $729,000—are 13% 
more likely to file for bankruptcy, and borrowers with small loan sizes 
are less likely to file. We also find that census tracts with a greater share 
of minority residents decrease the likelihood of bankruptcy.  
Table 6 presents a similar model, but this time we assess the factors 
that influence the likelihood that a borrower receives a loan 
modification. There are some interesting and significant differences in 
the effects of the covariates related to filing bankruptcy versus receiving 
a modification. First, while borrowers with an ARM are generally more 
likely to file for bankruptcy, they are less likely to receive a loan 
modification. Borrowers who received an ARM with a teaser interest 
rate or a prepayment penalty, however, are more likely to receive a loan 
modification—the opposite of what the bankruptcy models show. In 
addition, borrowers who provided limited or no documentation at 
origination are significantly less likely to receive a modification. This is 
not surprising, given that income verification is a condition for 
receiving a HAMP modification. Although not directly analogous to the 
loan origination process, it is likely that borrowers who obtained a no-
documentation loan would face more challenges documenting their 
income during the modification process.83  
Second, borrowers with the lowest FICO scores are the most likely 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.  
 83. A competing explanation may be that those borrowers who took out a no-
documentation loan would be less interested in applying for a modification in the first place, 
since their interest in the property was more speculative. 
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to receive a modification, perhaps indicating that servicers are reluctant 
to modify loans of borrowers who may have historically shown capacity 
to repay and may be strategically defaulting or can cure the default 
without a modification. Similarly, the fact that loans in neighborhoods 
with higher educational attainment are slightly less likely to be modified 
may suggest that servicers are considering the likelihood of strategic 
default to determine whether to grant a modification,84 although again it 
is worth pointing out that the effects of the neighborhood characteristic 
variables are small. 
Third, while higher LTVs are associated with a slight increase in the 
incidence of loan modifications, borrowers with LTVs between 50% 
and 90% are more likely to receive a loan modification than those with 
an LTV above 100%. However, consistent with the argument that the 
presence of a second lien makes a modification more difficult to secure, 
this study finds that the 80% LTV dummy significantly reduces the 
likelihood of receiving a modification. Borrowers located in MSAs that 
experienced significant house price appreciation are more likely to be 
modified, as are borrowers located in areas that have held their value 
since origination. Very small and jumbo loans are both less likely to be 
modified than loans underwritten for more conventional amounts. 
Given these differences, how do bankruptcies and modifications 
affect the ability of a borrower to cure their delinquency and avoid 
foreclosure? Table 7 presents the results of this analysis, examining the 
role of bankruptcy and modification on the hazard of curing the loan 
(returning to “current” status), remaining active but delinquent, or 
ending in foreclosure. Each of the models includes both year of 
origination dummies and state fixed effects.85 
Both bankruptcy and loan modification significantly reduce the risk 
of ending up in foreclosure. However, the reason differs across the two 
forms of relief. While filing bankruptcy reduces the risk of foreclosure, 
it increases the likelihood that a borrower will remain active but 
delinquent. In contrast, borrowers who receive a loan modification are 
significantly more likely to cure. Delinquent borrowers who receive a 
modification are 2.4 times more likely to cure than similarly situated 
borrowers who do not receive a modification. The other control 
variables in the model perform as expected. Borrowers with lower FICO 
scores, higher LTVs, limited or no documentation, and loans with 
riskier product features are all more likely to end in foreclosure, even 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Been et al., supra note 52, at 24.  
 85. We also tested the effect of including the number of days to foreclosure to see if the 
longer duration of delinquencies would affect the model findings. The results were qualitatively 
similar to the models with the state fixed effects, with the state fixed effects performing slightly 
better on goodness-of-fit tests. 
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after controlling for bankruptcy filing or loan modification. 
Do the effects of bankruptcy or loan modification differ depending 
on the loan product and purpose? To assess this, we stratified the data 
into four different samples: purchase loans with fixed interest rates, 
purchased loans with adjustable interest rates, refinance loans with fixed 
interest rates, and refinance loans with adjustable interest rates. The 
results of these models are presented in Table 8. While the story is quite 
consistent across product and purpose types, it is interesting that 
bankruptcy has a greater effect on reducing the likelihood of foreclosure 
for ARMs. In addition, modifications for purchase ARMs are very 
effective at shifting borrowers into current status; delinquent borrowers 
who had a purchase ARM and who received a modification are nearly 
2.8 times more likely to be current than similar borrowers who did not 
receive a modification. 
Because loan seasoning can significantly influence mortgage 
outcomes, we ran the same models on the subset of delinquent 
mortgages originated in 2006.86 We also ran the models using a multiple 
imputation (MI) approach to account for the 12% of delinquent loans 
missing data for the loan performance outcome variable.87 The results of 
both of these robustness checks are presented in Table 9. Neither of 
these robustness checks change the findings significantly. The largest 
difference is the effect of loan modifications on whether a loan becomes 
current. Focusing only on 2006 originations increases the effectiveness 
of loan modifications compared to the model for all origination years. 
This is supported by other studies that have looked at modifications.88 
In contrast, imputing missing variables reduces the effectiveness of the 
                                                                                                                     
 86. By definition, the proportional hazards framework incorporates time as a key element 
of the model, measured as the duration between origination and event. In addition, the models 
include a control for year of loan origination. However, it is possible that there are other 
elements of loan seasoning that are important in determining loan performance, above and 
beyond the duration measure. 
 87. While researchers are often reluctant to impute values on the dependent variable and 
either treat missing variables as right censored or use complete case analyses, there is an 
increased interest in using MI strategies to account for missing data. Rebekah Young & David 
R. Johnson, Imputing the Missing Y’s: Implications for Survey Producers and Survey Users 
6242, 6242–43 (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at 64th Annual Conference of 
the American Association for Public Opinion Research), available at   
http://www.amstat.org/sections/srms/proceedings/y2010/Files/400142.pdf. To impute the 
missing values, five replicate datasets were created, with the missing values separately filled in 
with plausible random values drawn from the conditional distribution given the observed data. 
Each model was then estimated separately for all five datasets, and then estimates were pooled 
to yield coefficients and standard errors that reflect the uncertainty about the missing values. 
The dependent variables were included in the imputation and model and the imputed values 
were retained in the subsequent analysis. 
 88. See, e.g., Been et al., supra note 52, at 36. 
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modifications, although they are still associated with reduced 
foreclosures and delinquencies and an increase in loans that are current. 
Overall, we find that bankruptcy filings, holding borrower and loan 
variables constant, decrease the risk of completed foreclosures by delay, 
not by completed cures or prepayments. Borrowers who filed 
bankruptcy were more likely to end the study period still in their homes, 
but still behind in payments. In contrast, borrowers who received a loan 
modification were significantly more likely to avoid foreclosure and 
minimize the risk of redefault. 
B.  State-Level Variations in Bankruptcies and  
Loan Performance Outcomes 
One question is whether the subprime crisis, and the rapid rise and 
fall of mortgage debt, has led more consumers to file for bankruptcy. 
Overall, bankruptcy rates are up, and there has been a significant rise in 
bankruptcies in states that were hit hard by subprime lending and 
resulting foreclosures, such as Arizona, California, Florida, and 
Nevada.89 Yet there are also states, such as Tennessee, that have long 
had high rates of bankruptcy, often attributed to a local culture that 
promotes bankruptcy through administrative practices and norms.90 This 
section uses the CTS data to further explore state-level variations in 
bankruptcy filings during the subprime crisis.  
Interestingly, we find that historical state variations in bankruptcy 
filings persist, despite differences in delinquency rates across states. In 
December 2006, prior to the onset of the crisis, the states with the 
highest percentage of mortgages in bankruptcy were Tennessee, 
Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Ohio. As of June 2011, this 
ranking remained nearly the same, with Louisiana replacing Ohio for 
the fifth spot. In contrast, the state rankings for foreclosure rates 
changed dramatically over the same period. In the CTS data, the top 
five foreclosure rates in December 2006 were for Michigan, Ohio, 
Indiana, Mississippi, and Kentucky—primarily Rust Belt states and 
Gulf states affected by Hurricane Katrina. However, the foreclosure 
landscape looked quite different in June 2011, with Florida, New Jersey, 
Nevada, New York, and Illinois ranking as the five states with the 
highest foreclosure rates—reflecting the boom and bust nature of the 
subprime crisis.91  
Indeed, historical variations among the states in bankruptcy filings 
eclipse any variations that may be attributed to a rise or fall in home 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See Matthews, supra note 12. 
 90. Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of 
Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 820 (1994). 
 91. See CTS Data, supra note 66. 
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mortgage debt or any other trend resulting from the foreclosure crisis. 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative percentage of borrowers ever sixty-days 
delinquent, as well as the percentage of borrowers who filed 
bankruptcy, organized by state. There is very little correlation between 
states that have high rates of borrower delinquency and those states that 
have a large share of bankruptcy filings. 
Might bankruptcy influence loan outcomes differently depending on 
the local bankruptcy culture or variations in state foreclosure laws? 
Anecdotally, housing counselors and attorneys report that they are more 
likely to recommend that clients consider bankruptcy in nonjudicial 
foreclosure states due to the difficulty of defending or delaying 
foreclosures in those states. Table 10 presents the results for the loan 
sample stratified by judicial and nonjudicial states.92 We find that 
bankruptcy filing has a stronger foreclosure prevention effect in 
nonjudicial states.  
We also find interesting differences in the effects of bankruptcy 
filing on foreclosure by state. For example, in California, filing 
bankruptcy has a relatively strong effect on delaying foreclosure, 
whereas in Florida the effect is small, and in New York it appears that 
those who file bankruptcy are more likely to lose their homes to 
foreclosures. These findings suggest that a homeowner’s likelihood of 
filing bankruptcy and its effect on preventing delinquency, other things 
equal, will be affected by their state and local bankruptcy culture—
including the extent of lawyer advertising, how easy it is to fund 
bankruptcy lawyer fees through the plan,93 state exemptions, and other 
variables that are difficult to measure but that collectively influence 
bankruptcy outcomes. For example, New York had a relatively strong 
antipredatory lending law in place during the subprime boom, and is a 
judicial foreclosure state with a strong mediation statute and state 
funding for housing counselors and lawyers. In contrast, California is a 
nonjudicial foreclosure state with a weaker antipredatory lending law 
                                                                                                                     
 92. We code the following states as nonjudicial states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, 
Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Frank S. 
Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial States, 31 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 350 n.25 (2011); see also JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., FORECLOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS DEPRIVE HOMEOWNERS OF 
BASIC PROTECTIONS 12 (2009). 
 93. For example, if in state A the lawyer’s fee for Chapter 13 is $1,500 and can all be 
included in the monthly plan payments, and in state B the fee is $3,000 and must be partly paid 
in cash up front, similar mortgage borrowers will have different probabilities of filing 
bankruptcy. See Lois R Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 114, 119 (2012). 
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and that, until 2012, had a weak mediation statute.94 Because New York 
offers many other tools to delay foreclosures, bankruptcy filers in New 
York have likely been filtered for the better prospects for cure or 
modification (i.e., adverse selection). Bankruptcies in California, on the 
other hand, may be used to delay foreclosure and allow time for a cure 
or modification. These variations are interesting, and suggest the need 
for future research on how variations in state law, legal practice, and 
culture may shape consumer mortgage outcomes.  
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy filings have helped to prevent foreclosures in the narrow 
sense of delaying the ultimate forced sales of homes, but not in the 
broader sense of curing defaults. Homeowners filing bankruptcy during 
the crisis had a reduced likelihood of remaining in bankruptcy long 
enough to confirm a Chapter 13 plan or get a discharge. The existing 
bankruptcy system does not appear to be a good fit for the foreclosure 
debt crisis of 2007. Mortgage defaults resulted first from a structural 
affordability crisis brought on by homeowner leverage and loans with 
escalating payments, and second from recession and unemployment. 
Permanent modifications of mortgage loans negotiated outside of 
bankruptcy appear to have been much more effective in curing defaults 
and preventing foreclosure sales than filing bankruptcy and invoking the 
workout tools of Chapter 13. On the other hand, bankruptcy filings have 
provided some aid to delinquent borrowers, perhaps in combination 
with other strategies. Nevertheless, the results of this study suggest that 
incorporating mortgage modification tools into the Bankruptcy Code 
could greatly enhance its effectiveness as a tool for successful 
reorganization of homeowner debtors. 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Alan White et al., The Impact of State Anti-predatory Lending Laws on the 
Foreclosure Crisis, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 287 tbl.11 (2011) (noting that 
California’s predatory lending law was rated lower on various scales than New York’s); see also 
ALON COHEN & ANDREW JAKABOVICS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NOW WE’RE TALKING: A LOOK 
AT CURRENT STATE-BASED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS AND HOW TO BRING THEM TO 
SCALE 16–17, 27–28 (2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2010/ 
06/pdf/foreclosure_mediation.pdf. 
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Table 1: CTS Sample—Descriptive Statistics 
 
 All Loans Delinquent 
Loans 
   
Number of Loans 1,553,477 596,082 
   
Loan Purpose   
Purchase 42.9 47.1 
Refinance 57.1 52.9 
Cash Out Refinance 41.1 41.5 
   
Loan Characteristics   
Fixed 30 Yr Mortgage 20.0 15.2 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage 70.0 77.4 
Teaser ARM 37.9 48.8 
Balloon Payment 8.3 12.0 
Interest-Only Loan 27.2 25.9 
Negative Amortization 8.4 8.3 
Prepayment Penalty 52.2 63.9 
Full Documentation 51.0 51.3 
   
Borrower FICO Score   
FICO < 580 14.9 21.3 
580 <= FICO < 620 15.6 20.8 
620 <= FICO < 680 29.6 33.5 
680 <= FICO < 720 16.9 14.0 
FICO >= 720 23.1 10.5 
   
Loan to Value at Origination   
LTV < 50 5.5 1.6 
50 <= LTV < 80 32.1 22.8 
80 <= LTV < 90 45.6 53.9 
90 <= LTV < 100 13.3 17.3 
LTV >= 100 3.6 4.5 
Dummy Variable for 80% LTV 37.6 43.9 
   
Loan Size   
Loan < $75,000 9.0 11.0 
$75,000 <= Loan < $729,000 88.0 87.5 
Loan >= $729,000 3.0 1.5 
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Table 1 (cont.): CTS Sample: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 All Loans Delinquent 
Loans 
      
Year of Origination     
2001 1.1 1.5 
2002 2.8 2.6 
2003 10.3 5.4 
2004 20.2 16.3 
2005 37.1 38.3 
2006 28.5 36.0 
      
Socio-Economic and Housing Market 
Factors 
Mean Mean 
FHFA House Price Index, 1st Qtr 2000 127.2 126.4 
FHFA House Price Index at 
Origination 
217.4 225.0 
FHFA House Price Index, 1st Qtr 2011 184.1 178.2 
% Change, FHFA Index, 2000 and 
Origination 
37.4 39.3 
% Change, FHFA Index, Origination 
and 2011 
-19.7 -28.0 
Census Tract Median Household 
Income 
64,139 58,576  
Census Tract Median House Value 319,989 275,232  
Census Tract: Percent non-White 
Hispanic Residents 
38.9 42.4 
Census Tract: Percent 25 and Older 
College Graduates 
37.0 32.6 
County Unemployment Rate at 
Origination 
5.1 5.1 
County Unemployment Rate in 
December 2009 
10.2 10.6 
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Table 2: Bankruptcies and Loan Modifications in the CTS Sample 
 
 All Loans Delinquent Loans 
  1,553,477 596,082  
Filed Bankruptcy 7.7 17.9 
Received a Loan 
Modification 
8.4 19.9 
Bankruptcy and Loan 
Modification 
1.3 3.3 
 
 
Table 3: Final Loan Status for CTS Loans, by Relief Sought 
 
    Delinquent Loans 
  All Loans All Delinquent 
Loans 
Filed 
Bankruptcy 
Received a 
Modification 
  1,553,477  596,082 106,812 118,822  
Current 22.3 16.8 13.9 51.7 
Active 
Delinquent 
7.3 19.0 28.7 25.8 
Foreclosed 16.8 43.4 42.8 12.1 
Prepaid 38.8 8.7 4.4 1.0 
Unknown 14.8 12.2 10.2 9.4 
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Figure 1: CTS Sample—The Incidence of Foreclosures, Bankruptcies, 
and Loan Modifications 
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Figure 2: CTS Sample—Bankruptcy Termination Rates  
 
 
29
White and Reid: Saving Homes? Bankruptcies and Loan Modifications in the Foreclos
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1742 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
Table 4: Competing Risks Model Estimating the Likelihood of a Loan 
Ever Becoming Sixty Days Delinquent 
  Model (60+ Days Delinquent) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Loan Characteristics    
Purchase 0.133 0.004*** 1.14 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage 0.311 0.005*** 1.37 
Teaser ARM 0.229 0.004*** 1.26 
Balloon 0.098 0.006*** 1.10 
Prepayment Penalty 0.199 0.005*** 1.22 
Limited or No Documentation 0.248 0.004*** 1.28 
Borrower FICO Score (Reference: FICO<580)  
580 <= FICO < 620 -0.314 0.005*** 0.73 
620 <= FICO < 680 -0.689 0.006*** 0.50 
680 <= FICO < 720 -1.112 0.008*** 0.33 
FICO >= 720 -1.653 0.011*** 0.19 
Loan to Value at Origination (Reference: LTV >= 100%) 
LTV < 50 -1.361 0.016*** 0.26 
50 <= LTV < 80 -0.574 0.009*** 0.56 
80 <= LTV < 90 -0.236 0.009*** 0.79 
90 <= LTV < 100 -0.108 0.009*** 0.90 
80% LTV Dummy 0.111 0.006*** 1.12 
Loan Amount (Reference $75,000 <= Loan  < $729,000) 
Loan < $75,000 0.034 0.007** 1.04 
Loan >= $729,000 -0.013 0.017 0.99 
Socio-Economic and Housing Market Factors  
% Change in HPI, 2000 to Orig. 0.013 0.001*** 1.01 
% Change in HPI, Orig. to 2011 -0.008 0.000*** 0.99 
County Unemp. Rate, 2009 -0.035 0.003*** 0.97 
Percent non-White Hispanic  0.001 0.000*** 1.00 
Percent College Graduates -0.008 0.000*** 0.99 
Median House Value (log) 0.038 0.015*** 1.04 
Filed Bankruptcy (prior to 
loan becoming delinquent) 
0.960 0.008*** 2.61 
 
Year of Origination Yes   
State Fixed Effects  Yes   
Number of Observations 1,308,139    
 -2 LOG L 13,430,073    
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.  Competing risks framework with 
alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. 
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Table 5: Competing Risks Model Estimating the Likelihood of a 
Delinquent Borrower Files for Bankruptcy 
  Model (Bankruptcy) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Loan Characteristics    
Purchase -0.3163 0.0123*** 0.73 
Cash-Out Refinance -0.0294 0.0109* 0.97 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage 0.1175 0.0100*** 1.13 
Teaser ARM -0.0982 0.0086*** 0.91 
Balloon -0.0305 0.0114* 0.97 
Prepayment Penalty -0.0255 0.0085* 0.98 
Limited or No Documentation 0.0196 0.0077* 1.02 
Borrower FICO Score (Reference: FICO<580)   
580 <= FICO < 620 -0.0185 0.0113 0.98 
620 <= FICO < 680 0.0729 0.0114*** 1.08 
680 <= FICO < 720 0.1688 0.0138*** 1.18 
FICO >= 720 0.0254 0.0157 1.03 
Loan to Value at Origination (Reference: LTV >= 100%)  
LTV < 50 -0.9295 0.0429*** 0.40 
50 <= LTV < 80 -0.2642 0.0179*** 0.77 
80 <= LTV < 90 -0.1833 0.0188*** 0.83 
90 <= LTV < 100 -0.1178 0.0171*** 0.89 
80% LTV Dummy 0.0825 0.0124*** 1.09 
Loan Amount (Reference $75,000 <= Loan  < $729,000)  
Loan < $75,000 -0.1170 0.0152*** 0.89 
Loan >= $729,000 0.1255 0.0281*** 1.13 
Socio-Economic and Housing Market Factors  
% Change in HPI, 2000 to 
Orig. 
0.0033 0.0008*** 1.00 
% Change in HPI, Orig. to 
2011 
0.0025 0.0003*** 1.00 
County Unemp. Rate, 2009 0.0098 0.0030** 1.01 
Percent non-White Hispanic  -0.0012 0.0002*** 1.00 
Percent College Graduates 0.0017 0.0006* 1.00 
Median House Value (log) -0.1212 0.0206*** 0.89 
Year of Origination Yes   
State Fixed Effects  Yes   
Number of Observations         596,082    
 -2 LOG L       2,371,847    
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.  Competing risks framework with 
alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. 
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Table 6: Competing Risks Model Estimating the Likelihood that a 
Delinquent Borrower Receives a Modification 
  Model (Modification) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Loan Characteristics    
Purchase -0.2003 0.0118*** 0.82 
Cash-Out Refinance 0.0105 0.0109 1.01 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage -0.2722 0.0102*** 0.76 
Teaser ARM 0.2555 0.0091*** 1.29 
Balloon -0.0607 0.0104*** 0.94 
Prepayment Penalty 0.1449 0.0082*** 1.16 
Limited or No Documentation -0.1973 0.0073*** 0.82 
Borrower FICO Score (Reference: FICO<580)   
580 <= FICO < 620 -0.0781 0.0094*** 0.93 
620 <= FICO < 680 -0.2915 0.0099*** 0.75 
680 <= FICO < 720 -0.5206 0.0140*** 0.59 
FICO >= 720 -0.6000 0.0162*** 0.55 
Loan to Value at Origination (Reference: LTV >= 100%)  
LTV < 50 -0.1277 0.0329*** 0.88 
50 <= LTV < 80 0.1097 0.0188*** 1.12 
80 <= LTV < 90 0.0545 0.0194* 1.06 
90 <= LTV < 100 0.0019 0.0181 1.00 
80% LTV Dummy -0.1032 0.0115*** 0.90 
Loan Amount (Reference $75,000 <= Loan  < $729,000)  
Loan < $75,000 -0.3258 0.0141*** 0.72 
Loan >= $729,000 -0.3275 0.0361*** 0.72 
Socio-Economic and Housing Market Factors  
% Change in HPI, 2000 to Orig. 0.0140 0.0010*** 1.01 
% Change in HPI, Orig. to 2011 0.0061 0.0004*** 1.01 
County Unemp. Rate, 2009 0.0069 0.0028* 1.01 
Percent non-White Hispanic  0.0008 0.0002*** 1.00 
Percent College Graduates -0.0008 0.0005 1.00 
Median House Value (log) -0.0079 0.0196 0.99 
Year of Origination Yes   
State Fixed Effects  Yes   
Number of Observations         596,082    
 -2 LOG L 2,601,808   
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level. Competing risks framework with 
alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. 
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Table 7: Competing Risks Model Estimating Final Status of Loans Ever 
Sixty-Days Delinquent (Final Status: Current) 
  Model (Current) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.4244 0.0092*** 0.65 
Received a Loan Modification 0.8783 0.0100*** 2.41 
Loan Characteristics    
Purchase -0.0843 0.0113*** 0.92 
Cash-Out Refinance -0.0070 0.0105 0.99 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage -0.1065 0.0096*** 0.90 
Teaser ARM 0.0261 0.0093* 1.03 
Balloon 0.2860 0.0120*** 1.33 
Prepayment Penalty -0.0536 0.0080*** 0.95 
Limited or No Documentation -0.0416 0.0075*** 0.96 
Borrower FICO Score (Reference: FICO<580)   
580 <= FICO < 620 0.0503 0.0103*** 1.05 
620 <= FICO < 680 0.1028 0.0099*** 1.11 
680 <= FICO < 720 0.1241 0.0132*** 1.13 
FICO >= 720 0.1211 0.0144*** 1.13 
Loan to Value at Origination (Reference: LTV >= 100%)  
LTV < 50 0.1463 0.0290*** 1.16 
50 <= LTV < 80 -0.1130 0.0200*** 0.89 
80 <= LTV < 90 -0.2068 0.0207*** 0.81 
90 <= LTV < 100 -0.1959 0.0196*** 0.82 
80% LTV Dummy 0.0792 0.0118*** 1.08 
Loan Amount (Reference $75,000 <= Loan  < $729,000)  
Loan < $75,000 0.0577 0.0136*** 1.06 
Loan >= $729,000 -0.0380 0.0319 0.96 
Socio-Economic and Housing Market Factors  
% Change in HPI, 2000 to Orig. 0.0396 0.0014*** 1.04 
% Change in HPI, Orig. to 2011 0.0002 0.0003 1.00 
County Unemp. Rate, 2009 -0.0214 0.0036*** 0.98 
Percent non-White Hispanic  -0.0009 0.0002*** 1.00 
Percent College Graduates 0.0050 0.0005*** 1.01 
Median House Value (log) -0.3658 0.0225*** 0.69 
Year of Origination Yes   
State Fixed Effects  Yes   
Number of Observations         596,082    
 -2 LOG L 1,665,349   
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level. Competing risks framework with 
alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. 
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Table 7 (cont.): Competing Risks Model Estimating Final Status of 
Loans Ever Sixty-Days Delinquent (Final Status: Foreclosed) 
  Model (Foreclosed) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3039 0.0067*** 0.74 
Received a Loan Modification -2.2213 0.0100*** 0.11 
Loan Characteristics    
Purchase 0.2049 0.0087*** 1.23 
Cash-Out Refinance -0.0101 0.0083 0.99 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage 0.3568 0.0081*** 1.43 
Teaser ARM 0.3574 0.0065*** 1.43 
Balloon 0.2330 0.0075*** 1.26 
Prepayment Penalty 0.1540 0.0064*** 1.17 
Limited or No Documentation 0.1367 0.0055*** 1.15 
Borrower FICO Score (Reference: FICO<580)   
580 <= FICO < 620 -0.0393 0.0082*** 0.96 
620 <= FICO < 680 -0.1662 0.0079*** 0.85 
680 <= FICO < 720 -0.3971 0.0098*** 0.67 
FICO >= 720 -0.5842 0.0109*** 0.56 
Loan to Value at Origination (Reference: LTV >= 100%)  
LTV < 50 -1.8378 0.0395*** 0.16 
50 <= LTV < 80 -0.6856 0.0137*** 0.50 
80 <= LTV < 90 -0.2377 0.0136*** 0.79 
90 <= LTV < 100 -0.1153 0.0124*** 0.89 
80% LTV Dummy 0.0550 0.0088*** 1.06 
Loan Amount (Reference $75,000 <= Loan  < $729,000)  
Loan < $75,000 0.0435 0.0112*** 1.04 
Loan >= $729,000 0.0893 0.0212*** 1.09 
Socio-Economic and Housing Market Factors  
% Change in HPI, 2000 to Orig. 0.0057 0.0012*** 1.01 
% Change in HPI, Orig. to 2011 -0.0084 0.0003*** 0.99 
County Unemp. Rate, 2009 -0.0393 0.0039*** 0.96 
Percent non-White Hispanic  0.0000 0.0002 1.00 
Percent College Graduates -0.0024 0.0005*** 1.00 
Median House Value (log) -0.1547 0.0222*** 0.86 
Year of Origination Yes   
State Fixed Effects  Yes   
Number of Observations         596,082    
 -2 LOG L 5,542,493   
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level. Competing risks framework with 
alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. 
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Table 7 (cont.): Competing Risks Model Estimating Final Status of 
Loans Ever Sixty-Days Delinquent (Final Status: Active Delinquent) 
  Model (Active Delinquent) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2437 0.0070*** 1.28 
Received a Loan Modification -0.6181 0.0083*** 0.54 
Loan Characteristics    
Purchase 0.0381 0.0104** 1.04 
Cash-Out Refinance -0.0352 0.0098** 0.97 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage 0.0976 0.0083*** 1.10 
Teaser ARM -0.0261 0.0082** 0.97 
Balloon 0.2715 0.0110*** 1.31 
Prepayment Penalty -0.0198 0.0073* 0.98 
Limited or No Documentation 0.0705 0.0068*** 1.07 
Borrower FICO Score (Reference: FICO<580)   
580 <= FICO < 620 -0.0177 0.0106 0.98 
620 <= FICO < 680 -0.0497 0.0100*** 0.95 
680 <= FICO < 720 -0.0338 0.0120* 0.97 
FICO >= 720 -0.0207 0.0129 0.98 
Loan to Value at Origination (Reference: LTV >= 100%)  
LTV < 50 -0.3386 0.0310*** 0.71 
50 <= LTV < 80 -0.0979 0.0201*** 0.91 
80 <= LTV < 90 -0.0318 0.0209 0.97 
90 <= LTV < 100 -0.0304 0.0200 0.97 
80% LTV Dummy 0.0718 0.0114*** 1.07 
Loan Amount (Reference $75,000 <= Loan  < $729,000)  
Loan < $75,000 -0.1093 0.0146*** 0.90 
Loan >= $729,000 0.2103 0.0217*** 1.23 
Socio-Economic and Housing Market Factors  
% Change in HPI, 2000 to Orig. 0.0537 0.0016*** 1.06 
% Change in HPI, Orig. to 2011 -0.0023 0.0003*** 1.00 
County Unemp. Rate, 2009 -0.0274 0.0036*** 0.97 
Percent non-White Hispanic  -0.0004 0.0002 1.00 
Percent College Graduates 0.0044 0.0006*** 1.00 
Median House Value (log) -0.2115 0.0231*** 0.81 
Year of Origination Yes   
State Fixed Effects  Yes   
Number of Observations         596,082    
 -2 LOG L 1,929,658   
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level. Competing risks framework with 
alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. 
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Table 8: Competing Risks Model Estimating Final Status of Loans Ever 
Sixty-Days Delinquent, Stratified by Product and Purpose (Final Status: 
Current and Foreclosed) 
  Final Status (Current) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard 
Ratio 
All Loans 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.4244 0.0092*** 0.65 
Received a Loan Modification 0.8783 0.0100*** 2.41 
Purchase Fixed 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.4502 0.0324*** 0.64 
Received a Loan Modification 0.7700 0.0247 2.16 
Purchase - Adjustable Interest Rate 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.4977 0.0184*** 0.61 
Received a Loan Modification 1.0273 0.0175*** 2.79 
Refinance – Fixed 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3784 0.0185*** 0.69 
Received a Loan Modification 0.7545 0.0143*** 2.13 
Refinance - Adjustable Interest Rate 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3999 0.0137*** 0.67 
Received a Loan Modification 0.8820 0.0135*** 2.42 
 
 
  Final Status (Foreclosed) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard 
Ratio 
All Loans 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3039 0.0067*** 0.74 
Received a Loan Modification -2.2213 0.0100*** 0.11 
Purchase Fixed 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.1701 0.0240*** 0.84 
Received a Loan Modification -2.2417 0.0474*** 0.11 
Purchase - Adjustable Interest Rate 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3828 0.0095*** 0.68 
Received a Loan Modification -2.1728 0.0325*** 0.11 
Refinance - Fixed 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.1234 0.0186*** 0.88 
Received a Loan Modification -2.2111 0.0325*** 0.11 
Refinance - Adjustable Interest Rate 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.2807 0.0094*** 0.76 
Received a Loan Modification -2.2651 0.0147*** 0.10 
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Table 8 (cont.): Competing Risks Model Estimating Final Status of 
Loans Ever Sixty-Days Delinquent, Stratified by Product and Purpose 
(Final Status: Active Delinquent) 
 
  Final Status (Active Delinquent) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard 
Ratio 
All Loans 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2437 0.0070*** 1.28 
Received a Loan Modification -0.6181 0.0083*** 0.54 
Purchase Fixed 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2756 0.0243*** 1.32 
Received a Loan Modification -0.6429 0.0283*** 0.53 
Purchase - Adjustable Interest Rate 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2151 0.0122*** 1.24 
Received a Loan Modification -0.5650 0.0133*** 0.57 
Refinance – Fixed 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2939 0.0156*** 1.34 
Received a Loan Modification -0.6911 0.0174*** 0.50 
Refinance - Adjustable Interest Rate 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2302 0.0107*** 1.26 
Received a Loan Modification -0.6365 0.0121*** 0.53 
 
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level. Competing risks 
framework with alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. 
Models include all the control variables as in Table 7, including state 
and cohort fixed effects.
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Table 9: Competing Risks Model Estimating Final Status of Loans Ever 
Sixty-Days Delinquent, Alternate Specifications 
  Final Status (Current) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard 
Ratio 
Base Model    
Filed Bankruptcy -0.4244 0.0092*** 0.65 
Received a Loan Modification 0.8783 0.0100*** 2.41 
Model with 2006 Originations Only 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.4386 0.0166*** 0.65 
Received a Loan Modification 1.0729 0.0163*** 2.92 
Model using MI to Impute Outcome Variable 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.4339 0.0086*** 0.65 
Received a Loan Modification 0.4914 0.0079*** 1.63 
  Final Status (Foreclosed) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard 
Ratio 
Base Model    
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3039 0.0067*** 0.74 
Received a Loan Modification -2.2213 0.0100*** 0.11 
Model with 2006 Originations Only    
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3342 0.0102*** 0.72 
Received a Loan Modification -2.2055 0.0143*** 0.11 
Model using MI to Impute Outcome Variable   
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3108 0.0060*** 0.73 
Received a Loan Modification -2.0481 0.0096*** 0.13 
  Final Status (Active Delinquent) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard 
Ratio 
Base Model    
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2437 0.0070*** 1.28 
Received a Loan Modification -0.6181 0.0083*** 0.54 
Model with 2006 Originations Only 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.1996 0.0110*** 1.22 
Received a Loan Modification -0.7649 0.0117*** 0.47 
Model using MI to Impute Outcome Variable 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.1917 0.0062*** 1.21 
Received a Loan Modification -0.6420 0.0076*** 0.53 
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.  
Competing risks framework with alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. 
Models include all the control variables as in Table 7, including state fixed effects. 
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Figure 4: CTS Sample—Bankruptcy Filing and  
Delinquency Rates by State 
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Table 10: Competing Risks Model Estimating Final Status of Loans 
Ever Sixty-Days Delinquent, Stratified by Judicial/Nonjudicial States 
  Final Status (Current) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Judicial    
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3995 0.0159*** 0.67 
Received a Loan Modification 0.9617 0.0173*** 2.62 
Non Judicial 
Filed Bankruptcy -0.4210 0.0114*** 0.66 
Received a Loan Modification 0.8353 0.0120*** 2.31 
California  - Filed Bankruptcy -0.3613 0.020*** 0.70 
New York - Filed Bankruptcy -0.4009 0.043*** 0.67 
Florida - Filed Bankruptcy -0.4923 0.043 0.61 
  Final Status (Foreclosed) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Judicial    
Filed Bankruptcy -0.2101 0.0116*** 0.81 
Received a Loan Modification -2.4199 0.0208*** 0.09 
Non Judicial    
Filed Bankruptcy -0.3448 0.0082*** 0.71 
Received a Loan Modification -2.1551 0.0113*** 0.12 
California  - Filed Bankruptcy -0.2625 0.0112*** 0.77 
New York - Filed Bankruptcy 0.3323 0.0359*** 1.39 
Florida - Filed Bankruptcy -0.0408 0.0230 0.96 
  Final Status (Active Delinquent) 
  Coefficient S.E. Hazard Ratio 
Judicial    
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2029 0.0109*** 1.23 
Received a Loan Modification -0.5403 0.0120*** 0.58 
Non Judicial 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.2858 0.0088*** 1.33 
Received a Loan Modification -0.6664 0.0109*** 0.51 
California  - Filed Bankruptcy 0.3895 0.0134*** 1.48 
New York - Filed Bankruptcy 0.2798 0.0246*** 1.32 
Florida - Filed Bankruptcy 0.2791 0.0198*** 1.32 
 
*** <.0001, ** < .001, * < .01 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level. Competing risks framework with 
alternative outcomes being prepaid or right censored. Models include all the control 
variables as in Table 7, year fixed effects, but NOT state fixed effects. 
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